excludable aliens core interests in matters related to entry. 1 In particular, courts continue to distinguish the inherent interests of excludable aliens in immigration processes from the interests of deportable aliens, whom the courts recognize as having a distinct interest in remaining in the country, 12 and the interests of all persons outside the immigration setting, a realm where an interest in entry is not pertinent.' 3 In light of the failure of courts to recognize a core interest in entry, an alternative approach to determining when a due process interest is present could improve the plight of excludable aliens. Since 1970, courts have developed and increasingly relied upon the entitlement model to activate procedural due process. As explicitly outlined in Board of Regents v.
Roth, " ' 4 the entitlement approach necessitates procedural due process protections whenever the government creates a legitimate expectation that substantive standards will guide a decision of whether to grant a benefit. 5 For example, in Roth's companion case, Perry v. Sinderman, 1 6 _a state college policy provided that certain standards would guide the decisionmaking process on whether to rehire faculty. The Supreme Court held that procedural due process safeguards were necessary to protect the teacher's legitimate expectation of (or entitlement to) a decision in accordance with the prescribed standards. Only if a substantively fettered decisionmaking structure exists will a court find an entitlement interest. Courts examine primarily authoritative sources, like statutes and rules, 11. See infra notes 27-39 and accompanying text. 12. See supra note 8 (explaining distinction between excludable and deportable aliens and basis for deportable aliens' due process interests in immigration proceedings).
13. See, e.g., Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481 (1931) (recognizing constitutional rights of aliens located abroad in non-immigration context); United States v. Henry, 604 F.2d 908, 912-14 (5th Cir. 1979) (excludable alien is entitled to Fifth Amendment protection in federal criminal proceeding).
Although appealing to humanitarian concerns, scholarly commentary has been unpersuasive to courts because the proposed reasons for activating due process fail to include any precedent that can overcome the nonexistence of an inherent right to enter. See, e.g., Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 967-75 (11 th Cir.) (en bane) (following entry doctrine in context of challenge to parole process), affd on other grounds, 472 U.S. 846 (1985) ; see also Amanullah v. Nelson, 811 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1987) (following entry doctrine in challenge to parole process); Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1455 (11th Cir. 1986) (same), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 289 (1987) . The entry doctrine was cited without reconsideration in Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) (challenge to admissions process by excludable alien claiming to be reentering).
14. 408 U.S. 564, 576-78 (1972) . 15. Id. at 576-78. Although the respondent in Roth did not have a justified expectation, the Roth decision set forth the criterion for future recognition of due process interests based entirely on government action without any reference to the "brutal need" factor which played a key role in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (due process for welfare recipients). See also Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249-50 (1983) (only expectations of receiving substantive benefit create entitlements; expectations that government will engage in procedure cannot create entitlements); Hermann, The New Liberty: The Procedural Due Process Rights of Prisoners and Others Under the Burger Court, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 482 (1984) (examining rise of government-created liberty interests); Diver, The Wrath of Roth (Book Review), 94 YALE L.J. 1529, 1538-41 (1985) (discussing "the Roth Court's infamous entitlement trigger"); infra notes 16-17, 41-43, 61, 107, 117 and accompanying text (explaining developments in entitlement theory).
16. 408 U.S. 593 (1972) . and never the subjective, unilateral desires of the applicant, to assess the legitimacy of an expectation." Decisionmaking processes under three major provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)-withholding of return, 8 immediate relative status, 9 and parole 2 -appear to satisfy the Roth criterion for government-created due process interests. Even excludable aliens appear to possess entitlement interests in having these three remedies adjudicated with procedural due process protections. But courts have yet to decide whether the entry doctrine permits excludable aliens to use entitlement interests to invoke due process. Circuit court opinions have underscored the need to resolve this open question. 2 1 Most recently, a class of excludable aliens challenging immigration procedures presented the Eleventh Circuit with a claim that an entitlement interest had been created on their behalf by a speech President Carter delivered. 22 The government relied on two defenses. First, it argued that excludable aliens could not possess interests to activate due process in an immigration context. 2 3 Second, it contended that the President's speech did not create any entitlement interests under the progeny of Roth. 24 The Eleventh Circuit adopted the government's second argument, and thus there was no need to address the more complex question of whether excludable aliens could ever rely on entitlement interests to invoke procedural due process protection. 2 5 Significantly, the court commented that, to consider whether excludable aliens could validly use Roth entitlements to seek procedural due process protections, courts would first have to engage in the "arduous task" of "completely unravelling and then considering all of the permutations of this question" by "searching the penumbras and interstices of the various immigration law cases." '2 6 This Note undertakes -that task. 17. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577 (identifying entitlement interest through reference to "independent sources such as state law" and not by reference to "need," "desire," or "unilateral expectation" to resolve complex question of whether entry doctrine precludes due process protection of entitlement interests); see also Augustin v. Sava, 735 F.2d 32, 37-38 (2d Cir. 1984) (dictum referring to government-created due process interests that excludable aliens "may well" be able to use).
Whether entitlements related to interests in entry activate due process scrutiny is a federal constitutional question for courts to resolve and not subject to whether Congress intended or expected these entitlements to trigger due process. Cf Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 540-41 (requiring due process protection of entitlement even though legislature which created entitlement did not intend to trigger constitutional scrutiny of procedures [Vol. 98: 639
In Section I, this Note analyzes the scope of the entry doctrine. Section II explores whether the entry doctrine precludes the application of the entitlement approach to due process. This Section relies upon both general due process jurisprudence and entry doctrine precedent to demonstrate that excludable aliens may possess valid entitlement interests in immigration remedies. Section III then assesses three important processes-withholding of return, immediate relative status, and parole-to show that excludable aliens do possess entitlement interests related to entry. In addition, Section III considers the controversial issues that would dominate "what process is due" analyses if excludable aliens choose to utilize their entitlement interests in these three remedies.
I. THE SCOPE OF THE ENTRY DOCTRINE
The seminal case supporting the denial of procedural due process rights to excludable aliens is United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnesy. 27 Ellen Knauff challenged the denial of her application for admission because she never received a hearing. The Court first determined that the pertinent statutes did not provide for a hearing. 2 8 Then, addressing Knauff's constitutional challenge, the Court pronounced the oft-quoted principle: "Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned." 2 9 The basis for this ruling was that an alien seeking admission into the United States has no inherent right of entry; therefore, this non-existent right cannot sustain a core interest entitled to due process protection. 0 Subsequent case law has shed light on the scope of the Knauff principle, now called the "entry doctrine." In Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 3 ' an excludable alien had been denied admission without a hearing and placed in a detention facility. Justice Clark, writing for the Court, explained that the central issue raised by these facts was whether the government could continue to detain Mezei without having held a hearing on the merits of the decision to confine him. 2 (due process applies despite government's interests in sovereignty and "administration of the immigration laws at the border"); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953) (powers over national security and admission at stake, but due process applies); see also infra note 37 and accompanying text (discussing aliens' rights at stake in Chew and Landon as distinguishable from interest in entry). to find an interest sufficient to invoke due process protections. The ground for this decision was reliance upon the Knauff principle that an alien arrives at the border without an interest in the right to enter. Thus, by characterizing Mezei's claim as only a variation of a claim to a core interest in the right to enter, the Court avoided recognition of his asserted liberty interest in freedom from detention. Recent circuit court decisions have relied upon the reasoning of Mezei to hold that excludable aliens' claims to various liberty interests in immigration processes merely constitute attempts to assert a core interest in a right to enter. 33 Following the reasoning in Mezei, if a court characterizes an alien's interest as distinct from an asserted core interest in the right to enter, then the entry doctrine may not preclude invocation of due process protections. Thus, in recent cases where courts have found an inherent constitutional interest that is not simply a variant of the right to enter, they have granted due process protections to excludable aliens in admissions related processes. For example, in Landon v. Plasencia, 34 the Supreme Court reviewed an alien's procedural challenge to the exclusion proceeding in which the immigration judge denied her claim that she was a returning resident entitled to admission. 5 The Court held that the alien, despite her placement in an exclusion hearing, had a core interest in the right to reenter at stake in the proceeding because she was trying to prove that she was a returning resident. 6 Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, deemed ments are made for his departure abroad" because hearing never preceded decision to detain him); see Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 734 F.2d 576, 581-82 (11th Cir. 1984) (explaining Mezei); Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 969-70 (11th Cir.) (en banc) (same), affd on other grounds, 472 U.S. 846 (1985) .
33. These courts apply the entry doctrine even though the immigration processes in question have no direct relationship to legal "entry" or admission of the alien to the country. The basis for these decisions is the Mezei Court's application of the entry doctrine to preclude access to due process in a detention adjudication, even though detention and parole processes have only an indirect relationship to "entry." See Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185 (1958) (whether government paroles or detains alien has no effect on whether alien has technically "entered"). While the immigration processes of parole and withholding of return are not directly linked to "entry," the progeny of Mezei holds that these pre-admission immigration processes are related to a right to enter for entry doctrine purposes. See, e.g., Jean, 727 F.2d at 969-70, 982 n.34 (reasoning from Mezei that non-existence of right to enter means excludable aliens lack inherent constitutional rights regarding applications for parole, asylum, and admission); Chun v. Sava, 708 F.2d 869, 876-77 (2d. Cir. 1983) (entry doctrine implies that excludable aliens have "very limited" inherent rights in withholding of return and asylum applications).
Even though neither parole nor withholding of return can modify pre-entry status, one call justify linking these processes to entry by their practical role in an excludable alien's continued presence in this country before an admission. See Fernandez-Roque, 734 F.2d at 581-82 (parole decision constitutes integral part of admissions process); infra note 74 and accompanying text (connection between withholding of return and continued presence in United States).
34. 459 U.S. 21 (1982) . 35 The Court first established that the INS had properly relegated Plasencia to an exclusion hearing because she could not be classified as a deportable alien and a "question of entry" was the issue presented by her admissions application. Id. at 28-32. 36. Id. at 32-34. the entry doctrine inapplicable by distinguishing an interest in the right to reenter from an interest in the right to enter. 37 Similarly, in Lynch v. Cannatella, the Fifth Circuit recognized an excludable alien's due process interest in the right to be free from inhumane treatment in the immigration process because this interest is not derived from an interest in the right to enter. 8 Landon and Lynch clarify the scope of the entry doctrine of Knauff and Mezei. These recent decisions confirm that the entry doctrine is not a blanket preclusion of all due process interests of excludable aliens challenging immigration procedures. Rather, the courts must carefully assess in each case whether the due process interests are separate from an asserted core interest in a right to enter. 39
II. THE Roth APPROACH

A. Compatibility with the Entry Doctrine
Due process interests do not flow only from core rights. Parallel case law in non-immigration contexts demonstrates that it is possible to possess a valid Roth right to due process in a situation barren of core interests. In entry doctrine case law as well, the denial of due process protection for a lack of core interests does not preclude reliance on entitlement interests.
Roth held that a due process interest can arise entirely as a result of a legitimate expectation which the government creates by assuring applicants that substantive standards will guide a decision of whether to grant a benefit." 0 The essential characteristic courts examine to detect the creation of a Roth interest is an indication that the final decision must be fettered by a clear, prescribed rule or rules. 41 This kind of analysis en-37. Id. at 33-34. The Court did not decide whether the excludable alien should be admitted, but did decide that the INS must resolve the question of whether she is a reentrant or an initial entrant in accordance with procedural due process. Id. at 28; see Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 600 (1952) (regardless of alien's technical classification, interest in reentry triggers due process).
38. 810 F.2d 1363, 1373-74 (5th Cir. 1987); see also Medina v. O'Neil, 589 F. Supp. 1028, 1032-33, 1040 (S.D. Tex. 1984) (excludable alien's due process interest in freedom from punishment can be recognized in challenge to INS detention procedure), rev'd on other grounds, 838 F.2d 800 (5th Cir. 1988). The precedent for these holdings is Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896) (alien granted due process protection of interest in freedom from punishment authorized by immigration laws). In Wong Wing the alien was a post-entrant, but the holding was interpreted in Lynch and Medina to stand for the proposition that a claim to a core interest in freedom from punishment is not a variation on a claim to a core interest in the right to enter.
In Gul v. Sava, No. 88-1220 (E.D.N.Y. filed April 20, 1988), the district cour, may confront this same issue. The government is trying to use the entry doctrine as a ground for dismissing this constitutional challenge by excludable aliens to the allegedly inhumane conditions of immigration detention in New York area hotels.
39. For a discussion of the core interests that entry doctrine precedents have construed as related to entry, see supra note 33 and accompanying text.
40. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 41. See, e.g., Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 226-29 (1976) (no interest because substance of final decision subject to adjudicator's "unfettered discretion"); see also infra notes 107 and 117 and accompanying text (discussing entitlement approach).
[Vol. 98: 639 ables courts to discern entitlement interests without any reference to the presence of core interests. Hence in Perry, the standards provided by the college to guide rehiring decisions created a due process interest for the professor regardless of whether there is an inherent right to future employment. 42 Similarly, the absence of a core interest in a right to enter should not automatically deprive excludable aliens of due process interests when immigration statutes create justifiable expectations.
Indeed, the availability of the entitlement interest approach may be discerned from the discussion of the entry doctrine in Knauff and Mezei. 3 In Knauff," the Court's determination that the excludable alien possessed no inherent interest in entering the United States did not completely resolve her procedural due process claim to a hearing on her application for admission. The final section of the Court's opinion implicitly recognized that, by statute, the government could have conferred upon Knauff rights that would "relieve [her] of her alien status,"* 5 -that is, a status lacking in due process interests related to her admissions application. 4 The Court declined to find a statutorily created interest entitling Knauff to due process protection only because the War Brides Act 47 expressly permitted the government to deny a war bride admission for any reason. 4 8 Mezei reaffirmed that Knauffs holding denying excludable aliens an inherent right to enter does not preclude the presence of a governmentcreated, due process interest related to that right. In justifying the denial of procedural due process in Mezei, the Court stated that "any right to enter the United States depends upon the Congressional will." ' 49 Signifi-42. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text; see also Board of Pardons v. Allen, 107 S. Ct 2415, 2417-22 (1987) (parole applicant possesses entitlement interest in state parole process even though no core right to parole exists); Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal Complex. 442 U.S. 1, 7. 12 (1979) (same).
43. The proposition that the Court foreshadowed the entitlement approach in the 1950's in Knauff and Mezei is supported by Professor Charles Reich's reliance on cases primarily from the same era to outline the jurisprudential roots of government-created due process interests. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1963); see also Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 555-56, 559 (1956) (no absolute right to government employment, but due process interest created by conditions of employment set by authorities), cited with approval in Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576 (1972 1988 ). Yet this is exactly the situation of the excludable alien in many admis-cantly, the Court did not state that a right to enter can never exist, but implied that legislation could create an entitlement to such a right. 5 0
The principle that procedural due process protects an excludable alien's expectations created by government action was recognized directly by the Second Circuit a few years after Mezei. In United States ex rel.
Paktorovics v. Murff, 51 that court determined that the federal government had made firm and substantive promises to Hungarian refugees regarding their admission to the United States. 52 Paktorovics challenged the procedures followed in the denial of his application for parole after he had arrived at the United States border and been placed in detention. The court found that the process by which parole was denied was permissible under the immigration laws. 5 " Nevertheless, the court held that Paktorovics, an excludable alien, was entitled to procedural due process protection on the ground that he possessed a liberty interest which the government's substantive promises had created. 54 The court declined to apply the entry doctrine. Unlike the excludable aliens in Mezei and Knauff, who were held to have no inherent right to enter, Paktorovics's interest was the product of government action. While the Paktorovics decision pre-dated the articulation of the entitlement approach in Roth, the Second Circuit foreshadowed the concept of protecting legitimate expectations induced by government action. 5 5 Recently, the Second Circuit has referred to interests in admissions related processes that excludable aliens "may well" possess, based on the application of Roth and its progeny. 5 " In these cases, procedural challenges were resolved on statutory grounds, with the "guidance" of due sions related contexts-lacking a core interest while being able to derive an entitlement interest from government action. Professor Reich describes feudal, Nazi, and Soviet legal systems as similarly denying the presence of inherent rights, while recognizing rights dependent upon government action for their existence. Reich, supra note 43, at 769-71.
50. The references in Knauff and Mezei to the possibility of a government-created right to enter did not concern merely whether excludable aliens could ever be entitled to enter. Both cases were procedural challenges arising under the Constitution; the discussion of the possibility of a right to enter in the context of these cases referred to a right to enter that would be protected by procedural due process. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text (outlining significance of substantive right in context of procedural challenge 
1989]
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 98: 639 process requirements. 7 These opinions lend further support to the applicability of the entitlement interest approach where excludable aliens do not possess any core interests.
B. Possible Obstacles
Although entry doctrine precedent permits excludable aliens to utilize the Roth approach, specific developments within the progeny of Roth may affect a court's application of the entitlement theory to excludable aliens' interests. The Supreme Court has suggested two circumstances that may preclude the recognition of entitlement interests: (1) when the deprivation of the benefit will have minor consequences; and (2) when the decision is "traditionally entrusted to the expertise" of the adjudicator. 8 These two factors should not affect the application of the Roth doctrine to immigration provisions.
The minor benefit characteristic does not apply to entitlements in admissions related processes, because the remedies there have major consequences for excludable aliens. 59 Precedent discussing the absence of aliens' inherent constitutional rights does not detract from the significance of the potential benefits offered to excludable aliens by immigration processes. These cases hold that excludable aliens have little to lose in the admissions process because they have yet to establish meaningful ties to this country." 0 The entitlement approach, however, concerns the prospective interest in legitimately expected benefits. 6 59. See infra note 71 (discussing private interests at stake in withholding of return, immediate relative status, and parole).
60. See, e.g., The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86, 100-02 (1903) (holding that interests of those who have yet to "enter" are not constitutionally significant because meaningful ties to country have not yet been established).
61. See Board of Pardons v. Allen, 107 S. Ct. 2415, 2417-22 (1987) (state parole applicant does not have presently enjoyed benefits at stake, but Court refrains from invoking minor benefit exception and recognizes entitlement in expected, future benefit of release).
Roth's statement that the entitlement approach's purpose is to protect "the security of interests that a person has already acquired," could be interpreted to limit the entitlement approach's scope to due process protection of those interests in an already possessed benefit. Roth, 408 U.S. at 576. Both L. TRIBE, supra note 49, § 10-9, at 690, and Comment, Entitlement, Enjoyment, & Due Process of Law, 1974 DUKE L.J. 89, 111-14, argue that endorsement of such a principle of present enjoyment is inconsistent with the entitlement approach to due process interests. Since an entitlement interest springs not merely from an individual need but from the structure of a process, the Roth approach has not distinguished between the legitimacy of government-created expectations in regard to applications for initial benefits and continuations of benefits. See, e.g., Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 12 (1979) (recognizing entitlement interest in not-yet-possessed benefit of parole release); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (protecting state-created liberty interest in prisoner's forthcoming freedom from incarceration). Only in the Greenholtz Court's discussions concerning the existence of a core interest and the nature of the safeguards required by due process did the principle of present enjoyment serve as a reference point. 442 U.S. at 9; see also Gregory v. Pittsfield, 470 U.S. 1018, 1018, 1021 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (noting that who possesses an entitlement interest in an admissions related process would be able to demonstrate that the benefits expected are not so insignificant as to fall within this exception.
In Hewitt v. Helms, 2 the Supreme Court suggested another possible exception to the general entitlement rule: when adjudicators may use their expertise to such an extent that they may base decisions upon standards not included in the promulgated criteria. 3 The standards for confining a prisoner to administrative segregation created an entitlement interest in Hewitt. Yet the Court noted that there may be circumstances in the context of prison operations where an entitlement would not exist, despite codified standards, because the unfettered expertise of prison officials traditionally governed the adjudication. 64 Thus, designated standards must guide the results of all decisions for a Roth interest to be present. 6 ' Solidly established precedent refers to the deference of both Congress and the judiciary to the expertise of immigration officials. 66 Immigration officials can manifest their expertise by establishing procedures and by implementing and interpreting the precise meaning of proper substantive criteria. 6 7 However, this deference is to a type of expertise that is entirely different from the expertise addressed in Hewitt. Under the case law, immigration adjudicators may not use their expertise as an excuse to ignore requirements-which are provided for in statutes, regulations, or other authoritative sources-that certain substantive standards guide decisions. 8 Accordingly, administrative expertise does not bar recognition of entitlement interests in immigration processes. 6 9 state aourt's adherence to present enjoyment principle in determining whether entitlement interests are present is "questionable reading of [Supreme] Court precedent," contrary to "weight of authority among lower courts," and "unsettling in implication" Section II demonstrated that entry doctrine and due process jurisprudence permit excludable aliens to possess entitlement interests when government action creates legitimate expectations in immigration processes. This Section asserts that expectations of an entitlement nature 0 actually exist in three major immigration processes: withholding of return, immediate relative status, and parole. In addition, this Section contends that each of these processes lacks certain procedural safeguards to which excludable aliens could claim due process rights pursuant to their entitlement interests."' nary power" in managing Indian land, Roth interest can still be created). Cf supra note 30 (compatibility of power over admission with procedural due process scrutiny).
70. See supra notes 15-17, 41-43 and accompanying text (discussing Roth and its progeny); infra notes 107, 117 and accompanying text (same).
All Roth interests can disappear with a reform of the decisionmaking structure that results in the elimination of the standards which fetter discretion. It is unlikely that legislators and rulemakers will attempt to restructure the three remedies discussed by this Note. In particular, policymakers are likely to refrain from modifying the substantive structure of the withholding of return process, because the statutory entitlement is rooted in the requirements of an international treaty to which the United States is a ratified signatory. See Each of the three Mathews factors is so significant in immigration processes in which excludable aliens participate that courts could reach widely varying results. The private interests in withholding of return, immediate relative status and parole can be, respectively, one's life, one's family and one's freedom from detention. The government interest in any immigration process is national sovereignty. The risks of error in reaching accurate decisions on applications for withholding of return, immediate relative status and parole are also high. The INS must determine, respectively, whether certain conditions in a foreign country endanger an individual's life or liberty, whether a marriage is a sham, and
A. Withholding of Return
The withholding of return statute provides excludable aliens with the opportunity to stop the United States from returning them to any country i, which they would face political persecution. 72 All excludable aliens denied admission to the United States have opportunities to submit withholding of return applications. 73 If a withholding of return application is successful, then the United States permits the alien to remain here until a more friendly nation can be found to accept him or her.""
The substantive structure of the decisionmaking process satisfies Roth criteria because the statute limits the discretion of an adjudicator to grant or withhold this remedy to an explicit list of standards. The statute mandates the approval of an application whenever an "alien's life or freedom would be threatened . . . on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion," ' 75 as long as the alien has never "participated in . . . persecution," "serious crime'"or acts "danger[ous] to the security of the United States." 7 The statute thereby creates a legitimate expectation that established standards will be followed in withholding of return adjudications. 77 Whether this Roth interest is viho. 'he alien will behave in the future. (1987) (discussing entitlement nature of withholding of return's decisionmaking process). (urts have implied in dicta that the withholding statute satisfies Roth criteria in excludable alien able for excludable aliens is likely to be tested in the near future. Currently the United States is attempting to return 2,746 Mariel Cubans to their homeland." In the wake of the recent riots by Mariel Cubans, particular attention will be paid to the procedures used to adjudicate individually their withholding applications."
Challenges may also be made to procedures other than those specifically used to resolve the excludable Marielito withholding applications. Excludable aliens apply for withholding of return at an exclusion proceeding. 0 Even though exclusion hearings offer many safeguards,"' important issues of procedural due process have yet to be resolved in the context of these proceedings: the lack of automatic notice of the right to petition for withholding of return, 2 the role of State Department Reports in assessing the validity of applications, 3 the lack of the right to appointed free counsel ,84 and the sufficiency of notice of when the hearing will take place. (1988) . Exclusion proceedings include the following safeguards: a hearing before a Justice Department immigration judge who is independent of the INS enforcement hierarchy; and the rights to be represented by counsel, call witnesses, present evidence and cross-examine government witnesses.
82. Currently such a notice is given only if the immigration judge identifies the case as one pertinent to such a claim. See Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 983 n.35 (11th Cir.) (en bane), affd on other grounds, 472 U.S. 846 (1985) . There have been mixed results in analogous suits brought by deportable aliens claiming the right to receive automatic notice of the opportunity to apply for asylum and for withholding of return in deportation proceedings. Ramirez-Osorio v. INS, 745 F.2d 937 (5th Cir. 1984) (no notice required); Orantes-Hernandez v. Meese, 685 F.Supp. 1488 (C.D. Cal. 1988) (notice required); Nunez v. Boldin, 537 F.Supp. 578 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (notice required).
83. The State Department provides "generic reports" on human rights in each nation to aid all withholding of return adjudications, and "individual reports" assessing how a specific applicant would be treated in a nation to aid selected adjudications. BHRHA Cuts Down Advisory Opinions, 64 Interpreter Releases 1215 (1987) . A generic country report can be disregarded by an immigration judge, In re Sibrun, 19 I. & N. Dec. No. 2932 Uan. 29, 1983), and can also be misleading where an individual has a unique situation. Potential constitutional issues raised by these reports include whether due process requires an individualized report whenever requested, and whether due process requires a State Department report which is not biased by the United States' current relations with the foreign nation. Judge Friendly criticized State Department reports as unreliable and inappropriate in Zamora v. INS, 534 F.2d 1055, 1062-63 (2d Cir. 1976), but in this case brought by deportable aliens, the extensive safeguards available at deportation hearings were held to be sufficient to compensate for any infringement upon due process caused by the reports. Id. at 1059-60.
One scholar suggests that due process might require notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures to precede the use of generic reports. Verkuil, supra note 71, at 1171-73.
84. 8 C.F.R. § 236 (1988) requires the INS to provide all those in exclusion proceedings with a list of free legal services. Note, Right to Appointed Counsel In Asylum Proceedings, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1157 REv. (1986 , argues that only appointed legal counsel is sufficient under due process standards when asylum and withholding applications are at stake. See also Orantes-Hernandez v. Meese, 685 F. Supp. 1488 (C.D. Cal. 1988) (not requiring appointed counsel, but declaring INS policies that interfere with access to counsel to violate due process interests of deportable aliens applying for asylum and withholding).
85. Deportation hearings have a seven day notice requirement, while an exclusion proceeding has
The Justice Department is currently attempting to revise the withholding application process for both excludable and deportable aliens." 6 A recent proposal was withdrawn because of widespread criticism that procedural due process protections were not present in the plan. 87 Should a future proposal add protections for deportable aliens but not excludable aliens, 88 it is possible that a Roth-based challenge may be brought successfully.
B. Immediate Relative Status
One of the only visa statuses which results in the benefit of admission, rather than a preference status subject to a quota, is that of an immediate relative to a citizen. 8 9 Immediate relatives make up the largest single class of immigrants to the United States." More than half of all immediate relative status immigrants are spouses; the majority of whom are excludable aliens while their immediate relative petitions are pending." The statute mandates that an application for an immediate relative visa be approved if the standard for being a bona fide immediate relative is met. 92 Such fettered discretion satisfies the Roth criteria. 93 In the process that determines whether the alien is a participant in a bona fide marriage, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) none. 8 U.S.C. § § 1225(B) , 1226, 1252(b)(1) (1982); 8 C.F.R. § § 236, 242 (1988) ; see Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 38-41 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (discussing procedural due process problems presented by this aspect of exclusion proceedings).
86. See Recent Developments, 64 Interpreter Releases 1214 (1987 has been accused of disregarding many procedural due process safeguards. 4 In response to a suit brought by deportable aliens with core interests at stake, a consent decree was entered which provides for elaborate procedural protections in regard to all marriage petitions submitted by aliens seeking immediate relative status in the New York INS district. 95 The INS does not yet guarantee these safeguards in other regions. If excludable aliens utilized their entitlement interest to challenge the immediate relative status process, particularly the bona fide marriage petition process, it is possible that the due process protections required in New York would be made applicable in other regions.
Although it might appear plausible for the citizen-spouse rather than the excludable alien-spouse to bring a constitutional challenge, courts have not always recognized the legitimacy of a citizen's interests in an alien's immigration applications. In Knauff and Mezei, the Supreme Court disregarded any possible constitutional interests of a citizen husband and a permanent resident wife, respectively. 9 6 More recently, the lower courts have split on the issue of whether a citizen has a constitutional interest in an alien-spouse's visa petition. 97 Overall, the availability of Roth entitlements could lead the judiciary to require significant alterations of current INS practices concerning the immediate relative status adjudicatory process.
C. Parole
Immigration parole 8 is a process of great import to excludable aliens. Many excludable aliens spend several years in the United States exhausting all of the opportunities offered by the admissions process. Theoretically, excludable aliens can remain in the United States indefinitely after having been denied all avenues of admission because no other country will 94. See, e.g., Id admit them at their border. 9 The parole process determines whether excludable aliens spend this time that precedes their admission or departure in a United States community with a sponsor or in a detention center.' 00 Although a Roth interest is not directly apparent from examination of statutory provisions, an analysis of the structure of the immigration parole decisionmaking process in light of recent Supreme Court precedents reveals that parole applicants arguably possess valid entitlement interests. The parole process contains few procedural safeguards. The decision is based entirely upon an adjudicator's interview of the applicant and a review of his or her INS file.' 0 ' There is also no notice of the opportunity to apply for parole.' 0 2 If due process scrutiny were applied to the parole process for the purpose of protecting excludable aliens' Roth entitlement interests, the courts would almost certainly require the implementation of such basic safeguards as notice and hearing.' 0 3
In Garcia-Mir v. Meese,"" the Eleventh Circuit denied claims by excludable aliens to entitlement interests in the parole process, because the process was not fettered by substantive standards that would create legitimate expectations.' 0 5 The court relied on the parole statute which provides that the Attorney General "may" parole detained aliens.' 0 8 The use of the word "may" led the court to conclude that a decision can be based on predesignated standards, any additional standards or no standards at all. Such a decisionmaking process fails to create an entitlement interest because no legitimate expectations exist concerning the precise substantive standards that must be used by adjudicators.
Nevertheless, the unfettered statutory discretion of the Attorney General should not necessarily eliminate the opportunities for the creation of a Roth interest. In determining if legitimate expectations are created, the Supreme Court's entitlement analyses have focused on whether there is unfettered discretion in the authority charged with exercising the decision- (1987) . making power over the applications, 10 7 who in the parole process is the parole adjudicator and not the Attorney General.0' 0 In Jean v. Nelson, 1 0 9 the Supreme Court had occasion, in the context of an equal protection challenge, to address the discretionary power available to immigration parole adjudicators. The issue in Jean was whether adjudicators could deny parole based on the applicant's Haitian nationality. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's conclusion that the parole process is structured in such a way that the adjudicators can only use the standards predesignated by their "superiors in Washington." 0 Since no standards authorizing discrimination based on nationality had been promulgated, the Court held that the adjudicators could not base a decision on the discriminatory standard alleged to have been used."' The case was then remanded to the district court to determine whether the decision denying parole could be supported by the specifically promulgated standards. The Court's portrayal of the parole process contradicts the apparent "empty set" of standards upon which the statute implies parole decisions can be based." 2 Jean v. Nelson represents the most authoritative precedent depicting the immigration parole process. Indeed, the court in Garcia-Mir relied upon Jean to support its denial of an entitlement interest in parole. Garcia-Mir ignored, however, the Jean opinion's reference to the necessity that the parole adjudicators follow only promulgated standards. The Garcia-Mir court assumed that a Roth interest in parole could not exist simply because Jean characterized the parole decisionmakers as having "broad discretion.""1 3 Significantly, a year after the Garcia-Mir decision on immigration parole, the Supreme Court in Board of Pardons v. Allen recognized that In future assessments of whether entitlement interests exist in the immigration parole process, courts should follow two steps in their analysis. First, they should look beyond the parole statute's language and examine the workings of the decisionmaking process itself to determine if legitimate expectations are created by the policies given so much weight in the Jean decision. Second, courts should not automatically conclude that parole applicants lack legitimate expectations simply because the process is "discretionary" in some respects. Under a proper analysis of the decisionmaking structure, immigration parole should be subject to due process scrutiny." 8
IV. CONCLUSION
The entry doctrine does not foreclose excludable aliens from validly invoking due process scrutiny in the immigration context when an interest distinct from a claim to an inherent right to enter is present. Furthermore, general due process jurisprudence and immigration precedents reveal that the entry doctrine does not bar excludable aliens from utilizing entitlement interests to activate procedural due process. Excludable aliens should have access to constitutional protections in three major immigration procedures-withholding of return, immediate relative status, and parole-because provisions under the INA create entitlement interests in the remedies offered by these processes. If excludable aliens use these interests in due process challenges, then courts may, for the first time, require the government to provide some fundamental procedural safeguards in admissions related processes. mandate or recommendation).
118. So far no court has scrutinized sufficiently the specific workings of the most rccently promulgated Mariel Cuban parole plan for this Note to determine whether the Marielitos possess entitlement interests in parole. See 8 C.F.R. § § 212.12, 212.13 (1988) . Although these new regulations purport to vest special Mariel parole adjudicators with the unfettered discretion described in the patrole statute, Jean revealed that the discretion of an immigration parole adjudicator can be significantly '(irumscribed" by "policies . . . established by the Attorney General and President" which are not mentioned in statutes or regulations. See 727 F.2d at 978-79.
